Can machines be conscious? by Koch, Christof & Tononi, Giulio

W
ould you sell your soul on eBay? Right now, 
of course, you can’t. But in some quarters 
it is taken for granted that within a genera­
tion, human beings—including you, if you can 
hang on for another 30 years or so—will have 
an alternative to death: being a ghost in a 
machine. You’ll be able to upload your mind—your thoughts, memo­
ries, and personality—to a computer. And once you’ve reduced your 
consciousness to patterns of electrons, others will be able to copy it, 
edit it, sell it, or pirate it. It might be bundled with other electronic 
minds. And, of course, it could be deleted. 
That’s quite a scenario, considering that 
at the moment, nobody really knows exactly 
what consciousness is. Pressed for a pithy 
definition, we might call it the ineffable and 
enigmatic inner life of the mind. But that 
hardly captures the whirl of thought and 
sensation that blossoms when you see a 
loved one after a long absence, hear an exqui­
site violin solo, or relish an incredible meal. 
Some of the most brilliant minds in human 
history have pondered consciousness, and 
after a few thousand years we still can’t say 
for sure if it is an intangible phenomenon or 
maybe even a kind of substance different 
from matter. We know it arises in the brain, 
but we don’t know how or where in the brain. 
We don’t even know if it requires specialized 
brain cells (or neurons) or some sort of spe­
cial circuit arrangement of them.
Nevertheless, some in the singularity 
crowd are confident that we are within a 
few decades of building a computer, a simula­
crum, that can experience the color red, 
savor the smell of a rose, feel pain and plea­
sure, and fall in love. It might be a robot with 
a “body.” Or it might just be software—a huge, 
ever­changing cloud of bits that inhabit an 
immensely complicated and elaborately con­
structed virtual domain.
We are among the few neuroscientists 
who have devoted a substantial part of their 
careers to studying consciousness. Our work 
has given us a unique perspective on what is 
arguably the most momentous issue in all of 
technology: whether consciousness will ever 
be artificially created.
We think it will—eventually. But per­
haps not in the way that the most popular 
 scenarios have envisioned it.
Consciousness is part of the natural 
world. It depends, we believe, only on mathe­
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 matics and logic and on the imperfectly 
known laws of physics, chemistry, and 
biology; it does not arise from some magi­
cal or otherworldly quality. That’s good 
news, because it means there’s no reason 
why consciousness can’t be reproduced 
in a machine—in theory, anyway.
In humans and animals, we know 
that the specific content of any conscious 
 experience—the deep blue of an alpine sky, 
say, or the fragrance of jasmine redolent 
in the night air—is furnished by parts of 
the cerebral cortex, the outer layer of gray 
matter associated with thought, action, 
and other higher brain functions. If a sec­
tor of the cortex is destroyed by stroke or 
some other calamity, the person will no 
longer be conscious of whatever aspect of 
the world that part of the brain represents. 
For instance, a person whose visual cor­
tex is partially damaged may be unable to 
recognize faces, even though he can still 
see eyes, mouths, ears, and other discrete 
facial features. Consciousness can be lost 
entirely if injuries permanently damage 
most of the cerebral cortex, as seen in 
patients like Terri Schiavo, who suffered 
from persistent vegetative state. Lesions of 
the cortical white matter, containing the 
fibers through which parts of the brain 
communicate, also cause unconscious­
ness. And small lesions deep within the 
brain along the midline of the thalamus 
and the midbrain can inactivate the cere­
bral cortex and indirectly lead to a coma—
and a lack of consciousness.
To be conscious also requires the cortex 
and thalamus—the corticothalamic sys­
tem—to be constantly suffused in a bath 
of substances known as neuromodulators, 
which aid or inhibit the transmission of 
nerve impulses. Finally, whatever the 
mechanisms necessary for consciousness, 
we know they must exist in both cortical 
hemispheres independently. 
Much of what goes on in the brain has 
nothing to do with being conscious, how­
ever. Widespread damage to the cerebel­
lum, the small structure at the base of 
the brain, has no effect on consciousness, 
despite the fact that more neurons reside 
there than in any other part of the brain. 
Neural activity obviously plays some 
essential role in consciousness but in itself 
is not enough to sustain a conscious state. 
We know that at the beginning of a deep 
sleep, consciousness fades, even though 
the neurons in the corticothalamic system 
continue to fire at a level of activity similar 
to that of quiet wakefulness.
Data from clinical studies and from 
basic research laboratories, made pos­
sible by the use of sophisticated instru­
ments that detect and record neuro­
nal activity, have given us a complex if 
still rudimentary understanding of the 
 myriad processes that give rise to con­
sciousness. We are still a very long way 
from being able to use this knowledge to 
build a conscious machine. Yet we can 
already take the first step in that long 
journey: we can list some aspects of con­
sciousness that are not strictly necessary 
for building such an artifact. 
Remarkably, consciousness does not 
seem to require many of the things we 
associate most deeply with being human: 
emotions, memory, self­reflection, lan­
guage, sensing the world, and acting in it. 
Let’s start with sensory input and motor 
output: being conscious requires neither. 
We humans are generally aware of what 
goes on around us and occasionally of 
what goes on within our own bodies. It’s 
only natural to infer that consciousness is 
linked to our interaction with the world 
and with ourselves.
Yet when we dream, for instance, we 
are virtually disconnected from the envi­
ronment—we acknowledge almost nothing 
of what happens around us, and our mus­
cles are largely paralyzed. Nevertheless, 
we are conscious, sometimes vividly and 
grippingly so. This mental activity is 
reflected in electrical recordings of the 
dreaming brain showing that the cortico­
A BETTER TURING TEST: shown this frame from the cult classic repo Man [top], a conscious 
machine should be able to home in on the key elements [bottom]—a man with a gun, another 
man with raised arms, bottles on shelves—and conclude that it depicts a liquor-store robbery.
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thalamic system, intimately involved with 
sensory perception, continues to function 
more or less as it does in wakefulness. 
Neurological evidence points to the 
same conclusion. People who have lost 
their eyesight can both imagine and dream 
in images, provided they had sight earlier 
in their lives. Patients with locked­in syn­
drome, which renders them almost com­
pletely paralyzed, are just as conscious as 
healthy subjects. Following a debilitating 
stroke, the French editor Jean­Dominique 
Bauby dictated his memoir, The Diving Bell 
and the Butterfly, by blinking his left eye. 
Stephen Hawking is a world­renowned 
physicist, best­selling author, and occa­
sional guest star on “The Simpsons,” 
despite being immobilized from a degen­
erative neurological disorder.
So although being conscious depends 
on brain activity, it does not require 
any interaction with the environment. 
Whether the development of consciousness 
requires such interactions in early child­
hood, though, is a different matter. 
How about emotions? Does a con­
scious being need to feel and display 
them? No: being conscious does not require 
emotion. People who’ve suffered damage 
to the frontal area of the brain, for instance, 
may exhibit a flat, emotionless affect; they 
are as dispassionate about their own pre­
dicament as they are about the problems 
of people around them. But even though 
their behavior is impaired and their judg­
ment may be unsound, they still experi­
ence the sights and sounds of the world 
much the way normal people do. 
Primal emotions like anger, fear, sur­
prise, and joy are useful and perhaps 
even essential for the survival of a con­
scious organism. Likewise, a conscious 
machine might rely on emotions to make 
choices and deal with the complexities of 
the world. But it could be just a cold, calcu­
lating engine—and yet still be conscious.
Psychologists argue that consciousness 
requires selective attention—that is, the 
ability to focus on a given object, thought, 
or activity. Some have even argued that 
consciousness is selective attention. After 
all, when you pay attention to something, 
you become conscious of that thing and its 
properties; when your attention shifts, the 
object fades from consciousness. 
Nevertheless, recent evidence favors 
the idea that a person can consciously 
perceive an event or object without pay­
ing attention to it. When you’re focused 
on a riveting movie, your surroundings 
aren’t reduced to a tunnel. You may not 
hear the phone ringing or your spouse 
calling your name, but you remain aware 
of certain aspects of the world around 
you. And here’s a surprise: the converse 
is also true. People can attend to events or 
objects—that is, their brains can preferen­
tially process them—without consciously 
perceiving them. This fact suggests that 
being conscious does not require attention.
One experiment that supported this 
conclusion found that, as strange as it 
sounds, people could pay attention to an 
object that they never “saw.” Test sub­
jects were shown static images of male 
and female nudes in one eye and rapidly 
flashing colored squares in the other eye. 
The flashing color rendered the nudes 
 invisible—the subjects couldn’t even say 
where the nudes were in the image. Yet the 
psychologists showed that subjects nev­
ertheless registered the unseen image if it 
was of the opposite sex.
What of memory? Most of us vividly 
remember our first kiss, our first car, or 
the images of the crumbling Twin Towers 
on 9/11. This kind of episodic memory 
would seem to be an integral part of con­
sciousness. But the clinic tells us other­
wise: being conscious does not require either 
explicit or working memory. 
In 1953, an epileptic man known to the 
public only as H.M. had most of his hippo­
campus and neighboring regions on both 
sides of the brain surgically removed as 
an experimental treatment for his condi­
tion. From that day on, he couldn’t acquire 
any new long­term memories—not of the 
nurses and doctors who treated him, his 
room at the hospital, or any unfamiliar 
well­wishers who dropped by. He could 
recall only events that happened before 
his surgery. Such impairments, though, 
didn’t turn H.M. into a zombie. He is still 
alive today, and even if he can’t remember 
events from one day to the next, he is with­
out doubt conscious.
The same holds true for the sort of 
working memory you need to perform any 
number of daily activities—to dial a phone 
number you just looked up or measure 
out the correct amount of crushed thyme 
given in the cookbook you just consulted. 
This memory is called dynamic because 
it lasts only as long as neuronal circuits 
remain active. But as with long­term mem­
ory, you don’t need it to be conscious.
Self­reflection is another human trait 
that seems deeply linked to conscious­
ness. To assess consciousness, psychol­
ogists and other scientists often rely on 
verbal reports from their subjects. They 
ask questions like “What did you see?” 
To answer, a subject conjures up an 
image by “looking inside” and recalling 
whatever it was that was just viewed. 
So it is only natural to suggest that con­
sciousness arises through your ability to 
reflect on your perception.
As it turns out, though, being conscious 
does not require self-reflection. When we 
become absorbed in some intense per­
ceptual task—such as playing a fast­paced 
video game, swerving on a motorcycle 
through moving traffic, or running along 
a mountain trail—we are vividly con­
scious of the external world, without any 
need for reflection or introspection. 
Neuroimaging studies suggest that we 
can be vividly conscious even when the 
front of the cerebral cortex, involved in 
judgment and self­representation, is rela­
tively inactive. Patients with widespread 
injury to the front of the brain demon­
strate serious deficits in their cognitive, 
executive, emotional, and planning abili­
ties. But they appear to have nearly intact 
perceptual abilities. 
Finally, being conscious does not require 
language. We humans affirm our con­
sciousness through speech, describing 
and discussing our experiences with one 
another. So it’s natural to think that speech 
and consciousness are inextricably linked. 
They’re not. There are many patients who 
lose the ability to understand or use words 
and yet remain conscious. And infants, 
monkeys, dogs, and mice cannot speak, 
but they are conscious and can report their 
experiences in other ways.  
S
o what about a machine? 
We’re going to assume that a 
machine does not require any­
thing to be conscious that a 
naturally evolved organism—
you or me, for example—doesn’t require. 
If that’s the case, then, to be conscious a 
machine does not need to engage with its 
environment, nor does it need long­term 
memory or working memory; it does not 
require attention, self­reflection, language, 
or emotion. Those things may help the 
machine survive in the real world. But to 
simply have subjective experience—being 
pleased at the sight of wispy white clouds 
scurrying across a perfectly blue sky—
those traits are probably not necessary.
So what is necessary? What are the 
essential properties of consciousness, 
those without which there is no experi­
ence whatsoever?
We think the answer to that question 
has to do with the amount of integrated 
information that an organism, or a 
machine, can generate. Let’s say you are 
facing a blank screen that is alternately 
on or off, and you have been instructed 
to say “light” when the screen turns on 
and “dark” when it turns off. Next to you, 
a photodiode—one of the very simplest 
of machines—is set up to beep when the 
screen emits light and to stay silent when 
the screen is dark. The first problem that 
consciousness poses boils down to this: 
both you and the photodiode can differen­
tiate between the screen being on or off, but 
while you can see light or dark, the photo­
diode does not consciously “see” anything. 
It merely responds to photons.
The key difference between you and 
the photodiode has to do with how much 
information is generated when the differ­
entiation between light and dark is made. 
Information is classically defined as the 
reduction of uncertainty that occurs 
when one among many possible outcomes 
is chosen. So when the screen turns dark, 
the photodiode enters one of its two pos­
sible states; here, a state corresponds to 
one bit of information. But when you see 
the screen turn dark, you enter one out 
of a huge number of states: seeing a dark 
screen means you aren’t seeing a blue, red, 
or green screen, the Statue of Liberty, a 
picture of your child’s piano recital, or any 
of the other uncountable things that you 
have ever seen or could ever see. To you, 
“dark” means not just the opposite of light 
but also, and simultaneously, something 
different from colors, shapes, sounds, 
smells, or any mixture of the above. 
So when you look at the dark screen, 
you rule out not just “light” but count­
less other possibilities. You don’t think 
of the stupefying number of possibilities, 
of course, but their mere existence corre­
sponds to a huge amount of information. 
Conscious experience consists of more 
than just differentiating among many 
states, however. Consider an idealized 
1­megapixel digital camera. Even if each 
photodiode in the imager were just binary, 
the number of different patterns that 
imager could record is 21 000 000. Indeed, the 
camera could easily enter a different state 
for every frame from every movie that was 
or could ever be produced. It’s a stagger­
ing amount of information. Yet the camera 
is obviously not conscious. Why not? 
We think that the difference between 
you and the camera has to do with integrated 
information. The camera can indeed be in 
any one of an absurdly large number of 
different states. However, the 1­megapixel 
sensor chip isn’t a single integrated sys­
tem but rather a collection of one million 
individual, completely independent photo­
diodes, each with a repertoire of two states. 
And a million photodiodes are collectively 
no smarter than one photodiode. 
By contrast, the repertoire of states 
available to you cannot be subdivided. You 
know this from experience: when you con­
sciously see a certain image, you experi­
ence that image as an integrated whole. No 
matter how hard you try, you cannot divvy 
it up into smaller thumbprint images, and 
you cannot experience its colors indepen­
dently of the shapes, or the left half of your 
field of view independently of the right 
half. Underlying this unity is a multitude 
of causal interactions among the relevant 
parts of your brain. And unlike chopping 
up the photodiodes in a camera sensor, dis­
connecting the elements of your brain that 
feed into consciousness would have pro­
foundly detrimental effects.
 T
o be conscious, then, you need 
to be a single integrated entity 
with a large repertoire of states. 
Let’s take this one step further: 
your level of consciousness 
has to do with how much integrated infor­
mation you can generate. That’s why you 
have a higher level of consciousness than 
a tree frog or a supercomputer. 
It is possible to work out a theoreti­
cal framework for gauging how effec­
tive different neural architectures would 
be at generating integrated information 
and therefore attaining a conscious state. 
This framework, the integrated informa­
tion theory of consciousness, or IIT, is 
grounded in the mathematics of infor­
mation and complexity theory and pro­
vides a specific measure of the amount of 
integrated information generated by any 
system comprising interacting parts. We 
call that measure Φ and express it in bits. 
The larger the value of Φ, the larger the 
 entity’s conscious repertoire. (For stu­
dents of information theory, Φ is an intrin­
sic property of the system, and so it is dif­
ferent from the Shannon information that 
can be sent through a channel.)
IIT suggests a way of assessing con­
sciousness in a machine—a Turing Test 
for consciousness, if you will. Other 
attempts at gauging machine conscious­
ness, or at least intelligence, have fallen 
short. Carrying on an engaging conversa­
tion in natural language or playing strat­
egy games were at various times thought 
to be uniquely human attributes. Any 
machine that had those capabilities would 
also have a human intellect, researchers 
once thought. But subsequent events 
proved them wrong—computer programs 
such as the chatterbot ALICE and the 
chess­playing supercomputer Deep Blue, 
which famously bested Garry Kasparov 
in 1997, demonstrated that machines can 
display human­level performance in nar­
row tasks. Yet none of those inventions 
displayed evidence of consciousness. 
Scientists have also proposed that 
displaying emotion, self­recognition, or 
purposeful behavior are suitable criteria 
for machine consciousness. However, 
as we mentioned earlier, there are peo­
ple who are clearly conscious but do not 
exhibit those traits. 
What, then, would be a better test for 
machine consciousness? According to IIT, 
consciousness implies the availability of 
a large repertoire of states belonging to 
a single integrated system. To be use­
ful, those internal states should also be 
highly informative about the world.
One test would be to ask the machine 
to describe a scene in a way that efficiently 
differentiates the scene’s key features 
from the immense range of other possible 
scenes. Humans are fantastically good at 
this: presented with a photo, a painting, or 
a frame from a movie, a normal adult can 
describe what’s going on, no matter how 
bizarre or novel the image is.
Consider the following response to a 
particular image: “It’s a robbery—there’s 
a man holding a gun and pointing it at 
another man, maybe a store clerk.” Asked 
to elaborate, the person could go on to say 
that it’s probably in a liquor store, given 
the bottles on the shelves, and that it may 
be in the United States, given the English­
language newspaper and signs. Note that 
the exercise here is not to spot as many 
details as one can but to discriminate the 
scene, as a whole, from countless others. 
So this is how we can test for machine 
consciousness: show it a picture and ask 
it for a concise description [see photos, “A 
Better Turing Test”]. The machine should 
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be able to extract the gist of the image (it’s 
a liquor store) and what’s happening (it’s a 
robbery). The machine should also be able 
to describe which objects are in the picture 
and which are not (where’s the getaway 
car?), as well as the spatial relationships 
among the objects (the robber is holding 
a gun) and the causal relationships (the 
other man is holding up his hands because 
the bad guy is pointing a gun at him).
The machine would have to do as well 
as any of us to be considered as conscious 
as we humans are—so that a human judge 
could not tell the difference—and not only 
for the robbery scene but for any and all 
other scenes presented to it.
No machine or program comes close to 
pulling off such a feat today. In fact, image 
understanding remains one of the great 
unsolved problems of artificial intelligence. 
Machine­vision algorithms do a reasonable 
job of recognizing ZIP codes on envelopes 
or signatures on checks and at picking out 
pedestrians in street scenes. But deviate 
slightly from these well­constrained tasks 
and the algorithms fail utterly.
Very soon, computer scientists will no 
doubt create a program that can automat­
ically label thousands of common objects 
in an image—a person, a building, a gun. 
But that software will still be far from 
conscious. Unless the program is explic­
itly written to conclude that the combina­
tion of man, gun, building, and terrified 
customer implies “robbery,” the program 
won’t realize that something dangerous is 
going on. And even if it were so written, it 
might sound a false alarm if a 5­year­old 
boy walked into view holding a toy pistol. 
A sufficiently conscious machine would 
not make such a mistake.
W
hat is the best way 
to build a conscious 
machine? Two com­
plementary strategies 
come to mind: either 
copying the mammalian brain or evolv­
ing a machine. Research groups world­
wide are already pursuing both strategies, 
though not necessarily with the explicit 
goal of creating machine consciousness.
Though both of us work with detailed 
biophysical computer simulations of the 
cortex, we are not optimistic that modeling 
the brain will provide the insights needed 
to construct a conscious machine in the 
next few decades. Consider this sobering 
lesson: the roundworm Caenorhabditis 
 elegans is a tiny creature whose brain 
has 302 nerve cells. Back in 1986, scien­
tists used electron microscopy to pain­
stakingly map its roughly 6000 chemical 
synapses and its complete wiring diagram. 
Yet more than two decades later, there is 
still no working model of how this mini­
mal nervous system functions.
Now scale that up to a human brain 
with its 100 billion or so neurons and 
a couple hundred trillion synapses. 
Tracing all those synapses one by one is 
close to impossible, and it is not even clear 
whether it would be particularly useful, 
because the brain is astoundingly plas­
tic, and the connection strengths of syn­
apses are in constant flux. Simulating 
such a gigantic neural network model in 
the hope of seeing consciousness emerge, 
with millions of parameters whose values 
are only vaguely known, will not happen 
in the foreseeable future. 
A more plausible alternative is to start 
with a suitably abstracted mammal­like 
architecture and evolve it into a con­
scious entity. Sony’s robotic dog, Aibo, 
and its humanoid, Qrio, were rudimen­
tary attempts; they operated under a large 
number of fixed but flexible rules. Those 
rules yielded some impressive, lifelike 
 behavior—chasing balls, dancing, climb­
ing stairs—but such robots have no chance 
of passing our consciousness test.
So let’s try another tack. At MIT, com­
putational neuroscientist Tomaso Poggio 
has shown that vision systems based 
on hierarchical, multilayered maps of 
 neuronlike elements perform admirably 
at learning to categorize real­world images. 
In fact, they rival the performance of state­
of­the­art machine­vision systems. Yet 
such systems are still very brittle. Move 
the test setup from cloudy New England to 
the brighter skies of Southern California 
and the system’s performance suffers. To 
begin to approach human behavior, such 
systems must become vastly more robust; 
likewise, the range of what they can recog­
nize must increase considerably to encom­
pass essentially all possible scenes.
Contemplating how to build such a 
machine will inevitably shed light on sci­
entists’ understanding of our own con­
sciousness. And just as we ourselves have 
evolved to experience and appreciate the 
infinite richness of the world, so too will 
we evolve constructs that share with us 
and other sentient animals the most inef­
fable, the most subjective of all features of 
life: consciousness itself.  o
To ProBe FurTher  For more on the 
integrated information theory of con-
sciousness, go to http://spectrum.ieee.org/
jun08/consciousmachines. 
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Douglas  
Hofstadter 
WHO HE IS 
Pioneer in computer 
modeling of mental 
processes; director of the 
Center for Research on 
Concepts and Cognition 
at Indiana University, 
Bloomington; winner of 
the 1980 Pulitzer Prize for 
general nonfiction.
SINGULARITY  
WILL OCCUR
Someday in the  
distant future
MACHINE 
CONSCIOUSNESS WILL 
OCCUR
Yes
MOORE’S LAW  
WILL CONTINUE FOR
20 more years
THOUGHTS
“It might happen someday, 
but I think life and 
intelligence are far more 
complex than the current 
singularitarians seem 
to believe, so I doubt it 
will happen in the next 
couple of centuries. 
[The ramifications] will be 
enormous, since the highest 
form of sentient beings on 
the planet will no longer 
be human. Perhaps these 
machines—our ‘children’—
will be vaguely like us 
and will have culture similar 
to ours, but most likely not. 
In that case, we humans 
may well go the way of 
the dinosaurs.”
